Ten years ago, NATO fought its first armed conflict, having launched an aerial campaign against Serbia over Kosova. The attack infuriated Russia, China and many states around the globe who had similar ethnic problems. It also united a broad spectrum of pacifistic, leftist, conservative and neonazi circles in Europe in oposition to war. But the result showed, once again, that justice occasionally is to swing a sword if it wants to be heard; the problem being, how to avoid making it a habit.
During the era of George W Bush, it became a fait accompli to regard Kosova as just another show of American cowboy practices, a typical intermezzo in between the invasion of Grenada and the invasion of Irak. In other words, it was judged to have been a bed step, pretty much like everything else that Bushism has accomplished. But those who said and still say so - and they are many - obviously haven't done their homework on Kosova.
The fact of the matter is, that back in 1999, no other credible option was at hand. Serbia had shown its blatant disregard for constitutional legitimacy back in March 1989, when it broke the constitution to revoke Kosova's autonomy, and later on when it staged mass meetings av Serb extremists throughout Yugoslavia. In the beginning of 1990's, it was once again Serbia’s leadership, which controlled the army and knew its opposition’s military weaknesses, who had shifted the conflict from a political to a military arena. In Kosova itself, Serbia had imposed a virtual apartheid for more than a decade, throwing Albanians out of government institutions, schools, and medicare, and cutting them off from all social benefits. The share scale of the oppression was simply shocking.
When an Albanian revolt finally occurred, Serbia hadn't waste a moment to scorche the earth. Scores of UNSC resolutions prior to the NATO intervention spoke of hundreds of thousands of IDP's and of "humanitarian catastrophe" - but fell short of giving green light to a military intervention, because of the Russian intransigence.
The question that NATO critics haven't answered satisfactory up today is simple. Given Milosevic in Serbia, and Russia in SC, what other decent option was there for NATO, other than to intervene?
It is obvious to me, that the lack of UNSC mandate speaks less of "US militarism" and "NATO aggression", and more of a paralyzed UNSC.
In the days and months to follow, NATO intervention also spurred an interesting debate on reform of UNSC and its permanent member's veto rights. Optimists also had a field day, hoping that Kosova could open for a much needed evolution of the international law. State sovereignty could perhaps be challenged more often, if it would be excised in such a fashion as to commit genocide and crimes against humanity.
Today, pessimists can conclude that this was not ment to be the case. No reforms in UNSC veto rights have been legally initiated, ergo there are no attempts to develop an international law more suitable for the 21'st century. As far as Kosova itself is concerned, instead of becoming the new rule it deserved to be, it was - and still is being - treated as an exception from the rule. Or, as diplomats prefer to call it, "a case of Sui seneris".
This, off course, hampers Kosova's avenue and the lives of us who happen to be citizens there. We can't look forward and see any light at the end of the tunnel, since there is no light there to be seen. We seem to have been confined into a tight Sui generis cage, without any time limitations or getaway strategies which would allow us to feel less Sui generis and more, say, normal.
But at least, we have got half the price: Kosova is legallly independent, albeight partially and under an unclear international mandate. As un-normal as this Sui generis might be, it is still better than before.
The community of democratic nations who intervened in Kosova, on the other side, wasted tons of perfectly good bombs to change absolutely nothing to the better for themselves. That makes them, not Kosova, the biggest looser of the entire Kosovar affair.